Sample report

A report should show what the evidence proves—and what it does not.

This is a hypothetical example built to demonstrate the report structure. It is not a customer result, scan statistic, or claim about a real application.

Hypothetical free scan · public-surface scope

example.app

Submitted URL
https://example.app/
Access
Public page only
Account
None
Active tests
None
1 Confirmed
1 Needs verification
1 Informational
1 Not tested
Confirmed F-001

Content-Security-Policy header is missing

Severity

Medium

Evidence
The HTML response for https://example.app/ did not include a Content-Security-Policy or Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only header.
Impact
CSP can limit the impact of some script-injection paths. Its absence is a hardening gap, not proof that script injection is possible.
Remediation
Define a policy from the resources the app actually needs. Start in report-only mode, review violations, then enforce the smallest workable allowlist.
Scope and limitation
Confirmed from the submitted page response. Other routes were not requested.

Retest: Not retested

Needs verification F-002

High-risk credential pattern appears in public JavaScript

Severity

High if privileged

Evidence
A referenced bundle contained a provider-specific value that matches the format of a privileged server credential. The value is redacted in the report.
Impact
If the value is current and privileged, a visitor could copy it. The free scan does not use the value, call the provider, or infer access from format alone.
Remediation
Verify the credential role in the provider dashboard. If it is privileged, revoke and rotate it, move the replacement server-side, and rebuild the public assets.
Scope and limitation
Pattern and public location observed. Role, validity, permissions, and reachable data were not tested.

Retest: Requires owner verification

Informational F-003

Supabase project URL and publishable client key are visible

Severity

None assigned

Evidence
The client initialization includes the project URL and an anon/publishable key, as expected for browser-side Supabase clients.
Impact
Visibility alone is not a secret leak. The security boundary is enforced by Row Level Security, grants, and server-side handling of privileged keys.
Remediation
Do not rotate a publishable key merely because it is public. Review RLS and grants through the planned Authorized source scan, or an equivalent owner-run review, if you need assurance about data access.
Scope and limitation
Key class identified from public configuration. No table, policy, or data request was tested.

Retest: No public-surface fix required

Not tested C-001

Row Level Security enforcement

Severity

Not rated

Evidence
No database table was queried and no authenticated role was exercised.
Impact
The public-surface report cannot conclude that RLS is correct, missing, or bypassable.
Remediation
Review policies, grants, ownership checks, and approved role behavior through the planned Authorized source scan, an equivalent owner-run review, or a Human security review.
Scope and limitation
Outside the free scan’s public-surface scope.

Retest: Needs authorized scope

Start with the public evidence.

The free scan checks browser-visible evidence. Authorized source analysis and human review cover deeper server-side controls.

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